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Pejoratives are negative terms for alleged social kinds: ethnic, gender, 
racial, and other. They manage to refer the way kind-terms do, relatively 
independently of false elements contained in their senses. This proposal, 
presented in the book, is called the Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term 
theory, or NHSKT theory, for short. The theory treats the content of pe-
joratives as unitary, in analogy with unitary thick concepts: both neu-
tral-cum-negative properties (vices) ascribed and negative prescriptions 
voiced are part of the semantics preferably with some truth-conditional 
impact, and even the expression of attitudes is part of the semantic po-
tential, although not necessarily the truth conditional one. Pejoratives 
are thus directly analogue to laudatives, and in matters of reference 
close to non-evaluative, e.g. superstitious social kind terms (names of 
zodiacal signs, or terms like “magician”). A pejorative sentence typically 
expresses more than one proposition and pragmatic context selects the 
relevant one. Some propositions expressed can be non-offensive and true, 
other, more typical, are offensive and false. Pejoratives are typically face 
attacking devices, although they might have other relevant uses. The 
Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term proposal thus fi ts quite well with 
leading theories of (im-)politeness, which can offer a fi ne account of their 
typical pragmatics.
Keywords: Pejoratives-slurs, Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term 
theory of pejoratives, reference, social kind terms.
1. Introduction
a) The main proposal
This is the precis of Nenad Miščević and Julija Perhat’s collection of 
papers, A Word which Bears a Sword. Semantics, Pragmatics and Eth-
ics of Pejoratives (Kruzak, Zagreb 2016), concentrating on the theoreti-
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cal part of it; for reasons of space I unfortunately have to leave aside 
the interesting and challenging contributions of Mirela Fuš, who is 
basically criticizing my proposal in her “Pejoratives as Social Kinds: 
Objections to Miščević’s Account”, Julija Perhat (“Pejoratives and Tes-
timonial Injustice”) and Ana Smokrović (“Hermeneutic Injustice and 
the Constitution of the Subject”), both connecting the use of pejora-
tives, in particular the gender ones, with testimonial and hermeneutic 
injustice. Last, but not least, let me mention Martina Blečić writing 
in more general terms about the connections between pragmatics and 
ethics (“Slurs: How Pragmatics and Semantics Affect Ethics”). This 
precis is constructed out of the book material (the long section “The 
fi ery tongue–The Semantics and Pragmatics of Pejoratives” due to Ne-
nad Miščević) re-proposing some of the main thesis of the book.
Pejoratives or slurs, I shall use the two words indiscriminately, are 
devices for face-attacking, as this term is now standardly used in theo-
ries of impoliteness. Jonathan Culpeper, for example, places them on 
the list of “impoliteness formulae” conventionally associated with of-
fense (2011: 56). Complaints about such offensive communication form 
a rich tradition, from Saint James Epistle to the present day politi-
cally engaged thinkers that Julija Perhat and Ana Smokrović discuss 
in their respective contributions.
The “Fiery tongue” offers a positive proposal. Pejoratives are nega-
tive terms for alleged social kinds: ethnic, gender, racial, and other. 
They manage to refer the way kind-terms do, relatively independently 
of false elements contained in their senses. I call the proposal Negative 
Hybrid Social Kind Term theory, or NHSKT theory, for short. The the-
ory treats the content of pejoratives as unitary, in analogy with unitary 
thick concepts: both neutral -cum- negative properties (vices) ascribed 
and negative prescriptions voiced are part of the semantics (preferably 
with some truth-conditional impact), and even the expression of at-
titudes is part of the semantic potential, although not necessarily the 
truth conditional one.
Why believe in unity? First, presumably, the speaker using a P-
sentence wants to demean the target on a series of interconnected 
grounds: X’s are bad because of such and such qualities, therefore, we 
should treat them so-and-so, and therefore I feel contempt for them, 
and invite you to join in it. Pejorative is not like “ouch”, just express-
ing an inner feeling; inner attitude is grounded in a way of seeing the 
target, and the way of seeing dictates the attitude. Pejoratives behave 
in the way one would expect on the basis of interconnectivity of compo-
nents. When one passes from mild to strong pejoratives, all components 
change in unison. Similarly, a good translation has to preserve all of 
the levels: from reference, through specifi c valuation to expression. 
Metaphorical (and metonymical) origins of pejoratives also testify to a 
holistic mapping. Take “Hun”, and old British pejorative for Germans. 
First, we have the vehicle, historical Huns: cruel primitive warriors, 
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who are very dangerous to potential victims, hated by them, and have 
to be fought to death by them. Next, the target: Germans, allegedly 
cruel primitive warriors, who are very dangerous to us, and have to 
be fought to death by us; of course, we hate them with good reason. If 
the components were independent, the holism would be unexplainable.
The unity of content also nicely fi ts the moral phenomenology of 
negative evaluation. Note that evaluation is not like cheering, support-
ing my club, and booing the other. The German-hater sees Germans as 
being in fact bad, not just being guys he is against (as in football). This 
goes well with wide speech act potential, both illocutionary and perlo-
cutionary, not limited to expressing solidarity with other boo-shouters. 
The pejoratives can fi gure in a 2nd person offense, 2nd person expres-
sion of solidarity (“I am with you, against these damned Huns!”), 3rd 
person both offense and solidarity, plus different prescriptions-sugges-
tions that go with it. Only a fi xed, semantic meaning can survive this 
variety, and thrive in it.
What about the truth-value of pejorative sentences, like “Lessing was 
a Hun”? Each of them express several propositions, some of them true 
(Lessing was a German), some false (Lessing had such-and-such nega-
tive character traits due to his nationality). The proposal is then briefl y 
generalized to other descriptive-evaluative terms, above all to lauda-
tives. Along the way, some well-known puzzles about pejoratives are ad-
dressed: the fi gurative origin of many of them, their occasional positive 
use by targeted social groups, the role of prohibition in relation to the 
“bad content”, the possible link with cognitive linguistics and more.
b) The Central Dilemma: empty or literally true
One can organize the discussion of pejoratives around an important 
dilemma haunting the theories of pejoratives. Here is one horn of the 
dilemma:
Pejoratives do refer. Boches are German, period. It’s a plus for the 
theory, since we normally don’t think that they are empty. However, 
the consequence is that the typical basic pejorative sentences are true, 
since the pejorative does refer, and the sentence ascribes to the target 
his or her actual belonging to the actual group: Hans is a Boche, The 
Boches are German, so the truth is secured. Pejorative sentences are 
simply and literally true, the bad stuff is not truth-conditional, and 
pejoratives do refer, simply and literally. Call it the veridicality view.
And here is the other, for those who do not like the idea that many 
typical pejorative sentences are true. The opposite line claims that the 
reference is empty: there are no Boches, faggots, and so on. The pejora-
tive stands for thick concept, so the negative component is essential to 
it; since (we know that) no group does satisfy the negative component, 
the concept is not satisfi ed, therefore empty.
Each horn is quite unappealing. For the fi rst horn, the veridicality 
option, part of the trouble is that the assertion of badness is not just 
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a by-the-way comment, the way it is presented, say by implicature ac-
counts. There, the badness is always part of expressing the standpoint 
of the speaker, independent from the main topic, the “at issue content” 
as called by Potts. The leading model for such a reading is offered by 
general expressive expressions, and sentences like “The fucking dog is 
again on the couch”. Here, the epithet does not primarily characterize 
the dog, but rather the speaker’s attitude to it. And the at-issue content 
is that the dog is on the couch. But “Boche” and “Čefur” are not like 
that. The attitude of the speaker is there, but backgrounded. What is in 
foreground is that the person is bad because German (or former Yugo-
slav), that is the “issue” in contrast to the typical implicature CI-read-
ing, where the at-issue content is just that the person is German (or 
former Yugoslav). The expressive dimension is present, but not crucial.
Consider now the non-veridicality side. It is in the clear with the 
falsity of the P-sentences. The minus is having empty reference for pe-
joratives; they do not refer simply and literally, they purport to refer, 
but there is a problem. The dominant ordinary intuition is that pejora-
tives do have reference. Moreover, how do they offend, if there is no-one 
to be justifi ably offended? The mere clash of intuitions does not solve 
the problem.
This is then, in my view, the Central Dilemma for the semantic view 
of pejoratives.
2. The way out
Let me point out a way to cope with confl icting intuitions about the 
truth of pejorative sentences. Take “Lessing was a Boche” (or Hun). 
The speaker who asserts it shows his knowledge of Lessing’s national-
ity; he cannot be accused of ignorance. On the other hand, we don’t 
want to accept the consequence that, yes, the proposition expressed is 
true, period. And we want to avoid the specter of disquotation, and the 
perspective of having to agree that Lessing was a Boche.
Here is the fi rst step to a possible way out: not all propositions ex-
pressed by pejorative sentences are false. Some defenders of the impli-
cature view recognize several propositions suggested by a P-sentence. 
One is the neutral and true sentence (Lessing was a German), other 
are nasty and problematic. They prefer the neutral one as semantically 
basic, which I must admit I fi nd counterintuitive. So, I want to borrow 
from them the general idea that pejorative sentences express a plural-
ity of propositions. Here is the minimum. “L. was a Boche” expresses at 
least 2 propositions:
L. was a German. (the true and decent proposition)
L. was cruel because German. (the false – and indecent – one)
Together with other pluralists, Potts and Bach, I suggest that the con-
text can stress one or the other of the propositions, but in contrast to 
the fi rst two authors I deny that the true proposition is basic.
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We now pass to the main question: if the negative content is part 
of the meaning, and even of truth-conditional meaning, how can the 
theoretician avoid the problematic corresponding horn of the Central 
dilemma, namely that the term is empty, with all its counterintuitive 
consequences?
An obvious way out is to detach the matter of reference from the 
matter of the literal truth of claims characterizing the pejorative con-
cept. Causal theories of reference have been suggesting this strategy 
for various terms and corresponding concepts, and we should turn to 
them to solve the Central dilemma.
So, what do pejorative meanings or concepts look like? I defend the 
following proposal: pejoratives are negative (derogatory) social kind-
terms, of a hybrid nature. Their referential apparatus involves a causal 
history of naming plus descriptive senses. The latter have a neutral 
part (given by a neutral description, German, African, female, gay) and 
the bad part (primitive, hateful, stupid, etc.), plus perhaps more. It is a 
social kind-term hypothesis. Surprisingly, it predicts the trouble with 
the truth-status, in virtue of the neutral/negative contrast: a part of the 
descriptive sense is neutral, and could (co)ground reference, the other 
part is negative and introduces the issue of falsity.
What we have encountered until now are at least two layers of 
meaning or meaning-like dimensions of pejoratives:
First, the minimal descriptive layer, which normally gives the fac-
tual information about the target group, and contributes to securing 
the reference of the term: African, gay, and so on, for the corresponding 
derogatory terms. Second, the negative descriptive-evaluative layer, 
which ascribes bad properties (“vices”) to the members of the target 
group and often insinuates that they have these properties in virtue of 
their belonging to the group.
Of course, this is not the end of the story. Many authors, for in-
stance M. Richard, point out that the use of pejoratives often involves 
a prescriptive suggestion: the target is to be despised (Richard 2008: 
15), others would add avoided, or discriminated against, because they 
exemplify the properties from the negative descriptive content. I am 
leaving an empty row, since I want to talk more about securing refer-
ence later, and will argue for a zero-level of meaning, having to do with 
the causal-historical link to the group. With these layers we have the 
minimal material to understand sentences like “L. was a Boche”:
L was German.
L belonged to the nation consisting of people, known as Germans, 
who are cruel because they are members of this nation.
shorter:
L. was cruel because German.
And we know that there is no nation of which the citizens are cruel just 
in virtue of belonging to it.
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PRESCRIPTIVE to be avoided, discriminated against! 
The three layers together give the pejorative content a certain “thick-
ness”: the word obviously expresses a content that ties together the 
descriptive and evaluative components, adding the prescriptive dimen-
sion connected with the latter. Christopher Hom has rightly insisted on 
the idea that these contents are “thick concepts” in the technical sense 
used in discussions in ethics (see Hom 2008). I concur with him on this 
point, but want to avoid what I see as the weakest point of available 
semanticist accounts, namely the counterintuitive consequence that 
pejoratives have empty reference.
Finally, we have the emotional-expressive content: using the pejora-
tive, the speaker expresses his own negative emotional attitude to the 
target. The dimension of contempt, of placing the target not only in the 
negative region, but also in the region signifi cantly “below” the (self-
assumed) level of the speaker, and thus marking her as “despicable”, 
can partly account for the offensiveness of some pejoratives, and their 
role in face-attacking verbal acts (“nigger” being the most infamous 
one). The expression of such offensive attitudes is akin to non-verbal 
insults, like spitting in someone’s face. No wonder that this offensive-
ness is sometimes described as “ineffability”.
3. Reference and the purely descriptive content
We fi rst have to address the issue of reference, before passing to the 
details of the characterization of the bad evaluative content. We have 
noted that reference of, say “Boche” should be independent of the joint 
truth-value, i.e. of falsity, of all components of the content of its pejo-
rative meaning; it certainly does refer to Germans, no matter what 
false ideas about them its use does insinuate. Luckily, there are two 
elements that are each independently plausible, and that, taken to-
gether give the result we need. The fi rst is that the typical referents of 
pejoratives are social kinds, most often real social kinds, like national-
ity, gender, age-groups and the like, and, more rarely, assumed kinds; 
this assumption is plausible independently of the Central dilemma and 
other semantic considerations.
So, I propose that pejoratives (and in particular slurs) are social 
kind terms. They refer to moderately clearly identifi ed groups of peo-
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ple, or to individuals under the guise of belonging to the group; either 
socially, or gender-based, or psychologically (e.g. through one’s sexual 
orientation). So, it is social kind terms, plus psychological kind terms 
that we should look at.
However, reference to kinds often is notoriously generally indepen-
dent from the speaker’s incorrect beliefs about the kind, as the behav-
ior of natural kind terms tends to show; centuries ago, people managed 
to refer to whales in spite of a lot of false beliefs about them. The refer-
ence seems to start with ostension, and tends to follow causal transmis-
sion links, not ideas people have about the kind. This gives us exactly 
what we need. Since we propose a hybrid account of reference, and also 
hypothesize that the referents are social kinds, real or alleged, the task 
divides itself into two: fi rst, characterize the relevant social kinds, and 
second, specify the mechanism of reference.
Candidate social-kinds form a rather heterogeneous bunch; items 
as mutually different as recession, racism, money, war, permanent 
resident, prime minister, African-American and German appear on the 
proposed lists of natural kinds. Note that the fi rst items listed are not 
analogous to typical biological kinds (like fi sh, or tiger), the last two 
are. We shall be interested in kinds like the last two, which classify 
collections of individuals. For our purposes good examples are ethnicity 
kinds: Croatian, Finn, and Italian, well known targets of pejoratives. 
Other examples would be women, gay people, members of some pre-
sumed race, perhaps age groups (youth, seniors, etc.) and professions 
(worker, businessman, journalist).
What about reference to social kinds? If pejorative are negative so-
cial kind terms, how do they refer? The preferable option would be that 
their mechanism of reference is parallel to the mechanism of reference 
for natural kind and artifact kind terms. There has been an act of bap-
tism, involving some kind of ostension, some characterizing of the tar-
get (we need it to avoid the qua-problem) and then a chain of transmis-
sion up to the present users. But is the parallelism tenable? Our main 
problem, familiar from the Central dilemma is the one of falsity: a lot of 
descriptions associated with concepts such as BOCHE are simply false 
about the intended target(s).
The account proposed is not ad hoc, nor specifi c to pejoratives, or 
even to evaluative adjectives and nouns in general. It can be applied to 
the latter, in particular to laudatives, but, more interestingly, to some 
nouns, like “medicine man” that carry problematic content in their pre-
sumed meaning.
Let us start with the easiest case, the laudatives. Take “Aryan” as 
used by a racist believer in the supremacy of the Caucasian “race”. The 
elements are the same as with pejoratives, only the negative valence 
is replaced with a positive one. The account can be easily extended to 
them.
Now pass to a different, non-evaluative sort of problematic terms, 
like “medicine man” or “Libra” that on the one hand seem to refer, and 
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on the other appear to have false elements in their senses. We assume 
that social kind terms like “teacher”, “German” and “women” are ref-
erentially relatively unproblematic. But what about “medicine man”, 
“theta-rays healer”, or close astrologico-psychological kinds: “Scorpio” 
or “Libra”? They seem referentially problematic in the way reminiscent 
of our problems with pejoratives. However, we need some background 
for addressing the issue(s).
First, focus on cases where religious or social beliefs mystify the 
characteristics of typical and defi ning activities of certain social groups. 
Consider the term “medicine man”. A relevant original group has been 
thus designated by original speakers (leaving the issue of translation 
aside). They were performing activities called by them and their audi-
ence “casting spells” and were assumed to have magic powers. The last 
assumption, is I submit, false. The “casting spells” characterization is 
ambiguous: fi rst, it can mean pronouncing words and performing ges-
tures that actually do produce results in a super-natural way, second, 
pronouncing words and performing gestures that are believed to pro-
duce the results in such a way by the relevant group of people, includ-
ing the “medicine men” themselves.
Consider now the sentence, concerning three offi cial “medicine 
men” of a given tribe, O, Lo and Bo: “O, Lo and Bo are medicine men”. 
Is it true or false? Well, what about magic powers? Presumably, O, 
Lo and Bo do not have magic powers; so it is literally false since they 
lack magic powers. But, in the mouth of an anthropologist the sentence 
probably expresses the proposition that the three men do perform the 
required activities and are taken to have magic powers. This second 
proposition is true.
Of course, one can object that “medicine man” is ambiguous between 
two readings, one that merely indicates a profession and the status 
that goes with it, call it “medicine manp” and the superstitious, magic 
related one “medicine manm”. When the average tribesperson uses the 
term, she talks of medicine manp, when the anthropologist uses the 
term, she refers to medicine manp. This is a legitimate understanding, 
but it leaves out the fact that both talk about the same people, that the 
anthropologist can try to persuade the tribesperson that these people 
have no magic powers, and so on. “Medicine man” is not ambiguous in 
the way in which “bank” is.
Now, take another problematic group, the names of astrological 
signs, e.g. “Scorpio”. The name presumably refers to persons born be-
tween October 23 and November 21; it has been transmitted for some 
thousands of years to the present times. On the other hand, it is also 
used to refer to people who presumably have such-and-such “Scorpi-
onic” character traits in virtue of being born in the given period of time. 
Here is a description taken from the web site:
Scorpio is the eighth sign of the zodiac, and that shouldn’t be taken lightly—
nor should Scorpios! Those born under this sign are dead serious in their 
mission to learn about others. There’s no fl uff or chatter for Scorpios, either; 
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these folks will zero in on the essential questions, gleaning the secrets that 
lie within. Scorpios concern themselves with beginnings and endings, and 
are unafraid of either; they also travel in a world that is black and white 
and has little use for gray. The curiosity of Scorpios is immeasurable, which 
may be why they are such adept investigators. These folks love to probe 
and know how to get to the bottom of things. The fact that they have a keen 
sense of intuition certainly helps. (http://www.astrology.com/scorpio-sun-
sign-zodiac-signs/2-d-d-66949)
I propose that in the context of astrology “Scorpio” is a hybrid name 
for a presumed, but highly problematic psychological kind, whose ref-
erence is determined both causally and descriptively, whereby the de-
scriptive component has two sub-components: the unproblematic, time 
interval component, and the problematic, superstitious character de-
scribing component.
Consider now the sentence: “Nenad is a Scorpio”; is it true or false? 
Suppose it expresses the neutral propositions:
Nenad is a Scorpio, he was born on November the fi rst.
It is true then. But here is the non-neutral, superstitious reading:
Nenad is a Scorpio, (as regards his character.)
And this one is false.
Interestingly, problems with reference and the plurality of proposi-
tions have nothing to do with evaluative elements. Also, the supersti-
tious material is not a comment on the descriptive material, the way 
in which negative material is seen by CI-theorists as a comment on 
factual material in the case of pejoratives.
The analogy with such hybrid terms reinforces the main point of 
my proposal: pejoratives, say “N”, are negative (derogatory) social kind 
terms, with a hybrid nature. Their reference is partly determined by a 
causal chain: the target group G has been called by somebody “N”, the 
name has been transmitted to the present users, and it refers to the 
group G and its members. Their descriptive senses have neutral mate-
rial (given by a neutral description (“German”, “female”, “gay”), and 
bad material (primitive, hateful, stupid, etc.) plus more. I have called 
the proposal the negative hybrid social kind terms hypothesis (NHSKT 
hypothesis).
4. The negative content
On the negative side we have several layers. The fi rst is evaluative, 
but most often it contains some descriptive or semi-descriptive com-
ponent: Boches are bad, for specifi c reasons, namely because of their 
cruelty and the like. I shall call this mixed layer “descriptive-evalua-
tive”, in contrast to a purely descriptive characterization, like “being a 
German”. Next, there are prescriptive and expressive layers, naturally 
connected to the negative evaluation.
The content at the descriptive-evaluative layer points to bad prop-
erties and ascribes them to the members of the target group, normally 
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with the insinuation that they have these properties in virtue of their 
belonging to the group. In characterizing the layer, I fi rst consider the 
properties themselves, both from a more socio-psychological viewpoint, 
and from anormative philosophical one. Then I turn to the meta-ethical 
characterization of the content having to do with its “thickness”.
So, what is being imputed? Let us focus upon full blooded pejora-
tives, involving rich negative material. I shall very briefl y offer two 
characterizations. One line one can take in characterizing the nega-
tive-descriptive (not prescriptive) content is to liken it to stereotypes.
The prototype associated with full-blooded slur is normally a very 
negative stereotype. Here are our two examples:
EXAMPLE “Boche” “curr”






of low origin, etc.
As mentioned, I take the second row to exemplify a dimension of mean-
ing of pejoratives, i.e. the negative descriptive-evaluative one. I assume 
gradation in badness since some pejoratives are more devaluing than 
others, for example in English: the negative value implied by “minx” is 
not as dramatic as the one belonging to “whore” (Hughes 2006: 163). 
We can have a plurality of closely related dimensions, say typical nega-
tive properties plus their degree of badness.
The second way to characterize the negative descriptive-evaluative 
content is to connect it to virtue ethics. Negative stereotypical traits will 
be then classifi ed as vices. Vices are often characterized as qualities that 
both attain bad ends or effects, and involve bad motives. For an illustra-
tion, along more traditional lines, consider the pejorative use of “pagan” 
in Pope’s injunction from St. Stephen’s day 2014: ”Don’t live like pagans, 
live like Christians!” Living like Christian includes practicing virtues 
like generosity, sexual moderation and the like. “Pagans” are persons 
that have lived with vices of greed and lust, presumably because they 
have not believed in the true god (or have not believed in god at all).
Let me now pass to thick concepts. Concepts uniting neutral de-
scriptive and evaluative components have been traditionally classifi ed 
as “thick concepts”. Thick concepts play important roles in various do-
mains of evaluation. When evaluating a policy in prudential terms we 
sometimes describe it as wasteful, stating that it wastes resources and 
implying that it is therefore less than adequate. Decisions are some-
times criticized as rash, people as being greedy. On the epistemic side, 
a proposal might be praised as thoughtful, and an idea as deep. On 
the esthetic side, thick concepts are the building blocks of art criti-
cism; think of ones like ELEGANT, KITCH, or TOUCHING.1 Thick 
1 I will adopt the convention of writing concept terms in capitals.
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concept-words are often likened to serious pejoratives (“Kraut”, “fag-
got”), another topic of quite intense research, although some authors 
deny similarity. However, most of the work done on thick concepts 
has been dedicated to moral ones, depicting virtues and vices, like 
COURAGE(OUS), CRUEL(TY), LEWD, NOBLE.
The original story of thick concepts, as told for instance by B. Wil-
liams (1985), was that they carry the (moral-) evaluative attitude on 
their sleeves, plus that the attitude is fi xed within a very narrow range: 
courage is admirable, period. Change the attitude, and the concept is 
gone.
The minimal form of thickness involves the unity between the de-
scriptive and the evaluative. And indeed, the properties associated with 
pejoratives are evaluatively rich properties posing as objective proper-
ties of the target. Even expressivists like Richard agree that pejora-
tives present their targets under a negative guise, and that the nega-
tive guise is not merely a general negative characteristic (the target is 
bad) but a rich more specifi c characterization (primitive, dangerous …). 
Note that even this minimal form of thickness creates problems for the 
separationists who propose an expressivist reading of the evaluative 
component.
We have noted the analogy between pejorative concepts and the usu-
al ethical thick concepts. But, there is an important difference between 
central, paradigmatic thick concepts and pejorative, slurish if you like 
the term, contents or concepts. Paradigmatic thick concepts are general, 
and centrally related to adjectives; they are the contents of correspond-
ing adjectives, not nouns. They just tell us about a presumed property, 
and it is an open question which kinds of entities carry the properties. 
The non-empty domain is not guaranteed: perhaps, there are lewd be-
haviors, lewd shows and the like, perhaps not. Things stand differently 
with generic pejoratives-slurs. They primarily target some given, in-
dependently identifi ed group, and their content is tied to nouns rather 
than to adjectives. The German hater starts with referring to Germans, 
and then goes on to ascribe cruelty to them, the gay hater starts with 
referring to gays, and then proceeds to suggest their presumed negative 
properties. This is why reference and reference-determining material is 
independent from the negative (evaluative, prescriptive etc.) features, 
and why pejoratives are (unfortunately) not empty.
We now pass to the further layer that naturally goes with evalu-
ative thickness, namely the prescriptive one. Value and prescription 
normally go together; this is the fi rst thing one learns in normative eth-
ics. With pejoratives it is the negative valuation that counts. Badness 
intrinsically repels the agent who understands it, and so on. To put it 
in nowadays usual form: at the least, the badness of X gives a prima 
facie reason to avoid (doing, encountering, having to do with) X.
We need a very modest form of this claim. First, we can rest satisfi ed 
with the phenomenological dimension: if our racist fi nds (experiences) 
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some qualities suffi ciently bad, this will give him, at least from his per-
spective, a prima facie reason to act in the way of avoiding, downgrad-
ing etc. items (things and people) whom he experiences as having these 
qualities. And, if he is consistent, he will be motivated to do it.
This brings us to the topic of thickness. The link to prescription is 
very strong in (the standard picture of) thick concepts: they essentially 
engage in “action guiding”. Now, if we accept the minimal thickness and 
add this link to the prescriptive component (and to queerness) we obtain 
a richer form of thickness. It encompasses motivation and prescription. 
What would be the message for the semantics of pejoratives? The con-
nection between negative value and corresponding prescription hold as 
well in the case of pejoratives, and points to the unity of pejorative mean-
ing. Many authors point out that the use of pejoratives often involves a 
prescriptive suggestion: the target is to be despised, others would add 
avoided, or discriminated against, because she exemplifi es the proper-
ties from the negative descriptive content. “Fags will burn in Hell” is a 
well-known variant of such prescriptivism, directed to the future and 
eternal suffering of gays. I will leave matters at this, but the interested 
reader might wish to consult Perhat’s chapter for further material.
Here is then the summary in the form of a table:




CAUSAL-HISTORICAL someone called them thus
MINIMAL DESCRIPTIVE African-American
NEGATIVE DESCRIPTIVE-
EVALUATIVE primitive, lazy, dangerous
PRESCRIPTIVE to be avoided, discriminated against!
PRAGMATIC EXPRESSIVE Yuck! and more
What is then the content expressed by a pejorative sentence? A typical 
content such sentences suggest is a plurality of propositions, in which 
the factual and the bad-material propositions are on equal footing, both 
of them are truth-apt and equally well expressed by the pejorative sen-
tence. The interest in context picks out the relevant proposition, and is 
responsible for treating the sentence sometimes as true (when the bad 
material is not in focus), sometimes as false (when the bad material is 
in focus).
Where do we go on from here? I have already mentioned the socio-
pragmatic framework of impoliteness research developed mostly by 
linguists and anthropologists (Leech 2014, Brown and Levinson 1987, 
Culpeper 2011). I believe there is theoretical unity and interconnected-
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ness that goes all the way from the semantics of pejoratives, through 
their pragma-linguistics (speech act theory), to socio-pragmatics, im-
politeness theory and rhetoric. A natural further step would be to try 
to unify the proposed semantic explanation(s) with their possible prag-
matic counterparts (which I try to do briefl y in the last chapter of my 
contribution (“Using the Verbal Poison: Pejoratives and Impoliteness-
Rudeness”). Another obvious direction would be to extend the seman-
tics (and pragmatics) of pejoratives to their symmetrically looking 
counterparts, laudatives, which would enhance the theoretical unity 
of the account(s).
So much for the main theoretical proposal. For interesting develop-
ments, criticism and ethical and political applications see the papers by 
other collaborators in the book.
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